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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
JOSE MORALES-TORRES, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
CaseNo.20000680-CA 
Priority 15 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § § 77-18a-1 (2)(a) 
(1999) and 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue presented for review is as follows: 
Whether the trial court properly quashed the bindover on a charge for arranging to 
distribute a controlled substance, where the state's undisputed evidence failed to establish that 
defendant committed a crime. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: " [T]he ultimate decision of whether to bind a defendant 
over for trial presents a question of law which we review de novo[,] without deference" to 
the trial court. State v. Hester. 2000 UT App 159, Tf5, 3 P.3d 725 (quoting State v. Jaeger. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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i 
896 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)), cert denied. 9 P.3d 170 (Utah 2000). 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following provision will be determinative of the issue on appeal: Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8 (Supp. 2000). The text of that provision is contained in the attached Addendum A. ( 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below. 
On March 10, 2000, Defendant/Appellee Jose Morales-Torres was charged with 
intentionally/knowingly arranging to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, a second 
degree felony offense under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (Supp. 2000). (R. 2-5.) On 
April 6, 2000, a preliminary hearing was held and the case was bound over to the district 
court for trial. (R. 18; 131.) In the district court, counsel for the defense moved to quash < 
the bindover on the basis that the state failed to present the necessary quantum of evidence 
to support the charged offense. (R. 35-40.) The trial judge granted the motion and remanded 
the case to the magistratejudge for further proceedings. (R. 113-114). A copy of the Order 
Quashing Bindover and Remanding to Preliminary Hearing Magistrate is attached hereto as 
Addendum B. Thereafter, the state asked the court to dismiss the matter, and filed its notice 
ofappeal. (R. 115; 118-119; 120.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 8,2000, two officers in an unmarked Ford pickup truck were "working in 
an undercover narcotics operation" near the area of 575 West 200 South, Salt Lake City. (R. 
2 
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131:4-5.) Officer Angeline Portel ("Portel") was a passenger in the truck, and "Officer 
Charman" was the driver. (R. 131:4; 131:6; 131:7-8.) 
Portel testified that while the officers were at that address, she noticed Morales-
Torres. (R. 131:5.) "[H]e was standing at a pay phone" with two white males. (R. 131:5.) 
"[T]hey were making a phone call and then standing by the phone, as if waiting for a call to 
be returned. And they were there for quite some time." (R. 131:5-6.) 
At some point, the three men left. Approximately 30 minutes later, Portel saw 
Morales-Torres again, "standing by the same pay phone." (R. 131:6.) Portel "gave a head 
nod" to Morales-Torres, and he nodded in response. (R. 131:7.) Portel testified that head 
nods are "used by buyers to communicate with drug dealers. Frequently, you need to make 
some sort of eye contact, head nod, wave." (R. 131:7.) 
When Morales-Torres "walked over to the truck," Portel "thinkfs]" she asked him, 
"Can you hook us up?" (R. 131:7; 131:16-17.) Morales-Torres asked what they needed. (R. 
131:8.) Portel testified, "coca" meaning "cocaine." (R. 131:8; 131:17.) 
According to Portel, Morales-Torres asked for "thirty-five cents for the pay phone." 
(R. 131:8.) Portel did not have any change so "we let him use one of our cell phones." (R. 
131:8.) Portel testified, they "paged a number together on the police cell phone and waited 
for the call to come back. About 30 seconds later, the phone rang and [Morales-Torres] had 
a conversation in Spanish with somebody." (R. 131:9.) 
Thereafter, Morales-Torres told Portel they "needed to go to 700 South and Ninth 
3 
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West" to meet a man "'cause he's eating right now[.]ff (R. 131:9-10.) Morales-Torres wanted 
to get into the truck with the officers. (R. 131:10.) They would not let him. (R. 131:10.) 
Morales-Torres told the officers he had to go with them because the man at the Seventh 
South address knew him and did not know them. (R. 131:10-11.) Portel and Charman 
would not relent. Instead, they "tried to negotiate the deal where maybe we could call the 
guy back and get him to come to where we were and [Morales-Torres] didn't want to do that. 
And we said, well, can we just go on our own and go meet him[.]" (R. 131:10-11.) 
When Morales-Torres would not agree, the officers terminated discussions. "We told 
him that we weren't going to do the deal, that we weren't going to drive out there[.]" (R. 
131:11.) Morales-Torres said "okay" and walked away, "down the sidewalk." (R. 131:11.) 
Shortly thereafter, two other officers, Smith and Budea, stopped Morales-Torres and arrested 
him. (R. 131:11-12.) Portel testified that Morales-Torres was searched and placed in the 
back of a police car where he was held "for awhile." (R. 131:12.) 
According to Portel, during their encounter with Morales-Torres, he did not say 
anything specifically about drugs or cocaine (R. 131:9-10), he did not use the term "dealer" 
(R. 131:15), and he did not make any comment to the officers as to what would occur at the 
Seventh South address. (R. 131:11.) 
Portel and Charman "later look[ed]" at the cellular phone "that Mr. Morales had used," 
and decided to drive to the "Seventh South Ninth West address." (R. 131:12.) "[W]e 
decided that we would just go there on our own anyway and try to find the guy." (R. 131:12.) 
4 
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When the officers arrived at the address, they "paged" the number that Morales-Torres had 
dialed on the police cell phone by hitting "redial." (State's Brief of Appellant ("State's 
Brief) at 4; R. 131:13.) Thereafter, the officers observed "a guy standing in the parking lot, 
[who] picked up the phone and started talking on it, so we said, Oh, that's him." (R. 131:13.) 
The officers made eye contact with the man in the parking lot. (R. 131:13; see 
also 131:7 (buyers use eye contact to communicate to drug dealers).) He approached their 
truck and said, "Oh, are you guys looking for something and we started working a deal with 
him and he said, yeah, you just paged me." (R. 131:13.) The officers purchased drugs from 
the man then arrested him. (R. 131:13.) 
On March 10, 2000, the state charged Morales-Torres with intent to arrange a drug 
distribution, a second degree felony offense. (R. 2-5.) The magistrate judge bound the case 
over for trial. (R. 18-19.) 
In June 2000, counsel for Morales-Torres filed a Motion to Quash Bindover or 
Dismiss in the trial court (R. 35-87), relying on this Court's ruling in State v. Hester. 2000 
UT App 159, 3 P.3d 725, cert denied. 9 P.3d 170 (Utah 2000). The defense argued that 
pursuant to Hester, the trial court should "remand" the case to the magistrate judge "for a new 
preliminary hearing or to dismiss" the matter. (R. 132:2.) The state opposed the motion on 
the basis that "[State v.] Hester may be wrongfully decided." (R. 132:5.) 
After hearing argument on the motion, the trial judge stated the following: 
Well, my view is, after reading this transcript [of the preliminary hearing] and 
I guess that's really the fact-intensive information that I need to rely on, one highlight 
5 
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t 
on Page 9, the answer to this question: [ff]And when these negotiations failed, what 
then did you do?[ff] 
["] We told him that we weren't going to do the deal [] that we weren't going 
to drive out there and he said okay. And he walked up — down the sidewalk and we 
just had him picked up then. ["] 
And then there is some questioning about whether he ever mentioned cocaine 
and apparently he didn't, although they were asking for cocaine. < 
The other problem that I have with this case is, he calls on the cell phone, he's 
speaking in Spanish and he may have been talking to [] this person that they 
ultimately ran into, but we don't know that. Nobody can establish that he talked to the 
person that was actually going to make the sale. For all I know, he was asking him 
for a recipe of some sort. ( 
I — I'm afraid I'm going to have to agree with Mr. Valdez. I just think that the 
evidence is so thin that I can't get there with a probable cause standard and I'm going 
to grant the motion to quash. 
(R. 132:6-7; 113-14 (finding no probable cause where (1) officer was unable to provide 
testimony relating to Morales-Torres' telephone conversation; (2) defendant did not have 
drugs; (3) defendant did not mention drugs; (4) officers broke off discussions and defendant
 { 
walked away; (5) officers independently initiated contact with a person at the Seventh South 
location and conducted negotiations; and (6) the state failed to present evidence linking the 
defendant to the person who dealt with officers at the Seventh South address).) 
Thereafter, the trial judge ordered the matter to be remanded to the magistrate judge 
for further proceedings. (See R. 113-14; 132:6-7 (matter remanded to the magistrate judge); 
see also 132:2 (defense requested remand for another preliminary hearing or dismissal).) On 
remand, the state sought dismissal on the basis that "the state was left with no other 
alternative." (R. 115.) The magistrate judge granted the Motion to Dismiss (R. 117-18), and 
the state filed a Notice of Appeal. (R. 120.) 
6 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The state charged Morales-Torres with intentionally and knowingly arranging to 
distribute a controlled substance, to wit, cocaine. At the preliminary hearing, the state was 
required to present a quantum of evidence under the probable-cause standard to support each 
element of the offense and to support that defendant committed the offense. 
The undisputed facts presented by the state at the preliminary hearing reflect that 
when officers asked Morales-Torres if he could "hook" them up, he asked what they needed. 
Morales-Torres then used the officers1 cellular telephone to page an unknown person. When 
the person returned the page, Morales-Torres had a conversation that officers did not 
understand. After Morales-Torres finished the call, he told the officers they needed to go to 
Seventh South and Ninth West where a man was eating. He also told officers he had to go 
with them. The officers refused to let Morales-Torres get in the truck. They tried to nego-
tiate some other arrangement. Morales-Torres would not agree. Thereafter, the officers told 
Morales-Torres they would not "do the deal," and they were not going to the Seventh South 
address. Morales-Torres said "okay" and walked away. He was subsequently arrested. 
Morales-Torres1 conduct did not constitute an offense. 
Portel testified that Morales-Torres did not say anything to them about cocaine or any 
other drug, and he did not use the term "dealer." Also, Morales-Torres did not make any 
comment about what would happen at the Seventh South address. 
7 
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Some time later, Portel and Charman decided to go to the Seventh South address. 
( 
When they arrived at that location, they hit "rediar on the cellular phone. While "redial" 
should have activated a pager, Portel considered it relevant that a man in the parking lot 
picked up his cellular phone and began to talk on it. (R. 131:13.) The officers believed the < 
man on the cellular phone was the person Morale-Torres had paged earlier. The officers 
made eye contact with the man and he approached their truck. The man engaged in a drug 
transaction with the officers. 
The state failed to present any evidence linking the man in the parking lot to Morales-
Torres. In addition, according to Portel's own testimony, Morales-Torres did not arrange or 
engage in the distribution that the officers ultimately consummated with the man in the 
parking lot. The evidence failed to support the probable-cause standard. The trial judge < 
properly quashed the bindover. 
ARGUMENT 
< 
THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY APPLIED THE PROBABLE-CAUSE 
STANDARD TO DETERMINE THAT THE STATEyS UNDISPUTED FACTS 
FAILED TO SUPPORT THAT MORALES-TORRES COMMITTED A 
CRIME. 
A. THE STATE MUST PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AT THE 
PRELIMINARY HEARING TO SUPPORT THE BINDOVER. 
1. The Preliminary Hearing Does Not Serve as a Rubber Stamp for the Prosecution. 
A defendant is entitled to a preliminary hearing where the state is required to present 
sufficient evidence to support a bindover to the trial court. See Utah Const, art. I, § 13; State 
8 
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v. Clark. 2001 UT 9, ]fl6 (February 6, 2001). Inasmuch as the preliminary examination 
serves to ferret out "groundless and improvident prosecutions," id at <fl 10 (citing Hester. 
2000UTApp 159. f7: State v. Anderson. 612 P.2d 778.783-84 (Utah 1980)), the state must 
present evidence at the hearing "for the magistrate to find f[p]robable cause to believe that 
"the crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed it."1" State v. 
Talbot. 972 P.2d435,437 (Utah 1998) (quoting State v. Pledger. 896 P.2d 1226,1229 (Utah 
1995); and Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h)(2)); Clark. 2001 UT 9, If 16. The evidence for a preliminary 
hearing "need not be capable of supporting a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Clark. 2001 UT 9, ^ [15. Nevertheless, the evidence must support each element of the offense 
and defendant's involvement in the offense. See id at fflf 15, 16. 
In considering the standard applicable to preliminary hearings, the Utah Supreme 
Court has stated the following: 
To bind a defendant over for trial, the State must show "probable cause" at a 
preliminary hearing by "presenting] sufficient evidence to establish that 'the crime 
charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed it.'" State v. 
Pledger. 896 P.2d 1226,1229 (Utah 1995) (quoting Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h)(2)). At this 
stage of the proceeding, "the evidence required [to show probable cause] . . . is 
relatively low because the assumption is that the prosecution's case will only get 
stronger as the investigation continues." Evans v. State. 963 P.2d 177, 182 (Utah 
1998) (citing Pledger. 896P.2dat 1229). Accordingly, "[w]hen faced with conflicting 
evidence, the magistrate may not sift or weigh the evidence . . . but must leave those 
tasks 'to the fact finder at trial.'" State v. Hester. 2000 UT App 159, f7, 3 P.3d 725 
(quoting State v. Wells. 1999 UT 27, %L, 977 P.2d 1192). Instead, "[t]he magistrate 
must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and must draw 
all reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution." IcL (citing Pledger. 896 P.2d 
at 1229). Yet, "[t]he magistrate's role in this process, while limited, is not that of a 
rubber stamp for the prosecution Even with this limited role, the magistrate must 
attempt to ensure that all 'groundless and improvident prosecutions' are ferreted out 
9 
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no later than the preliminary hearing." Id. (quoting State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 
783-84 (Utah 1980)). 
* * * ( 
We hold that to prevail at a preliminary hearing, the prosecution must still 
produce '"believable evidence of all the elements of the crime charged,1" State v. 
Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1992) (quoting State v. Smith. 675 P.2d 521, 524 
(Utah 1983)), just as it would have to do to survive a motion for a directed verdict. 
However, unlike a motion for a directed verdict, this evidence need not be capable of 
supporting a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Instead, we hold that the quantum of evidence necessary to support a bindover 
is less than that necessary to survive a directed verdict motion. Specifically, we see 
no principled basis for attempting to maintain a distinction between the arrest warrant ( 
probable cause standard and the preliminary hearing probable cause standard. Our 
efforts to articulate a standard that is more rigorous than the arrest warrant standard 
and is still lower than a preponderance of the evidence standard have only resulted in 
confusion. Therefore, at both the arrest warrant and the preliminary hearing stages, 
the prosecution must present sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that < 
an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it. See Anderson, 
612P.2dat783. [fn3] 
3 In a pragmatic sense, however, the State still has a higher bar 
at the preliminary hearing stage than at the arrest warrant stage . . . . 
[but the distinction has been reduced by the constitutional amendment 
allowing reliable hearsay at preliminary hearings]. 
This "reasonable belief1 standard has the advantage of being more easily understood < 
while still allowing magistrates to fulfill the primary purpose of the preliminary 
hearing, "ferreting out. . . groundless and improvident prosecutions." Anderson, 612 
P.2d at 783-84. 
Clark, 2001 UT 9, ffifl 0,15-16. If the state is able to establish the crime under the probable- < 
cause standard, the magistrate judge will bind the defendant over to answer to the 
charge in the district court. See Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h) (2000). Here, the district court judge 
properly quashed the bindover for the drug distribution charge, as set forth below. 
2. The State Was Required at the Preliminary Hearing to Establish Defendant's Role 
in a Drugs Distribution Under Section 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii).
 ( 
10 
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In this case, the state charged Morales-Torres under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8( 1 )(a)(ii) (Supp. 2000) with knowingly and intentionally arranging to distribute a controlled 
substance, to wit, cocaine. (R. 2-5.) Section 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) provides the following: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly 
and intentionally: 
* * * 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or 
arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance[.] 
Under that provision, "the State must show that an offer, agreement, consent, or 
arrangement to distribute controlled substances was made by the defendant and, whichever 
variation or variations it charges, that the behavior was 'engaged in knowingly or with intent 
that such distribution would, or would be likely to, occur."' Hester, 2000 UT App. 159, ][9 
(citing State v.Harrison. 601 P.2d 922,923 (Utah 1979)); Clark. 2001 UT 9,1J15 (state must 
produce "believable evidence" of all elements). 
The state must show that defendant committed some act in furtherance of an 
arrangement to distribute a controlled substance. "[I]f [a person] intends the distribution for 
sale of a controlled substance, any act in furtherance of an arrangement therefor constitutes 
the criminal offense described by the statute." Harrison, 601 P.2d at 924; see also id. at 923 
("[A]ny activity leading to or resulting in the distribution for value of a controlled substance 
must be engaged in knowingly or with intent that such distribution would, or would be likely 
to, occur"); State v. Gray. 717 P.2d 1313, 1320-21 (Utah 1986). 
11 
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The state also must establish "intent." The element of "intent" may be inferred from 
the facts of the case. Clark, 2001 UT 9, [^20 (intent reasonably inferred from facts). 
Intent to commit a crime can be "inferred from the actions of the defendant or from 
surrounding circumstances." State v. Murphy, 674 P.2d 1220, 1223 (Utah 1983). 
Proof of an actual sale is not an element of the crime of arranging, but such evidence 
"may be helpful, or even necessary, in proving knowledge or intent" in certain types 
of cases. Harrison, 601 P.2d at 924 n. 5. See State v. Renfro, 735 P.2d 43, 44 (Utah 
1987) (defendant discussed purchase price with officers, set price, showed narcotics 
to officers, and sale was completed in his home); State v. Scott, 732 P.2d 117, 118 
(Utah 1987) (sale of marijuana occurred at defendant's home and defendant handled 
negotiations overprice of drugs); State v. Gray, 111 P.2d 1313, 1315 (Utah 1986) 
(defendant drove to site where drugs were bought, divided drugs and gave some to 
buyer, and commented to buyer on quality of drugs). In the cases just cited, the 
defendant's intent can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances as well as from 
the fact that a completed transaction occurred. 
Hester, 2000 UT App. 159,1J11. 
In Hester, this Court recognized that a defendant's involvement may be established 
with proof of the "active steps" defendant took "to facilitate the completion of an illicit 
transaction." Hester, 2000 UTApp. 159, \\2 (citing State v. Gallegos, 851 P.2d 1185,1187, 
1190-91 (Utah Ct. App.1993) (defendant made multiple phone calls agreeing to find and 
provide various controlled substances to callers and was observed by police at meetings with 
individuals known to be involved in distribution of controlled substances); State v. Pelton, 
801 P.2d 184,185 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (defendant brought together buyer and seller and was 
knowing and intentional "link in a chain of events" that led to sale of cocaine by another), 
cert, denied, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah 1991); State v. Clark, 783 P.2d 68, 68-69 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989) (defendant attempted to contact drug dealer, commented on quality of drugs, 
12 
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and was present during negotiations for sale of drugs)). 
Also, "an aborted transaction can serve as the basis for an 'arranging' conviction, if the 
surrounding facts indicate that the defendant had intended to facilitate a completed drug 
sale." Hester. 2000 UT App. 159, If 12 (citing People v. May. 224 Cal.App.2d 436, 36 
Cal.Rptr. 715, 717 (1964) (defendant revealed detailed plan to buy drugs in Mexico, 
introduced officer to drug dealer, and invited officer to smoke marijuana with him); Francis 
v. State. 890 S. W.2d 510,513 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994) (defendant and undercover officers had 
engaged in prior drug transaction, defendant agreed to "get some" crack cocaine if they 
would drive him to seller, and defendant acted upon agreed transaction and walked with 
officers to their car)). In this case, the state failed to establish that defendant committed a 
crime under § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii). See Clark. 2001 UT 9, [^16 (prosecution must produce 
sufficient evidence to support that offense has been committed and defendant committed it). 
The trial court's ruling should be affirmed. 
B. THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN THIS 
MATTER. 
1. All Facts and Inferences Must Be Construed in Favor of the State. 
As recognized by the state (State's Brief at 6), ffat a preliminary hearing all evidence 
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution and [] the court must draw all 
reasonable inferences in the prosecution's favor.11 Hester. 2000 UT App. 159, [^15 (citing 
Pledger. 896 P.2d at 1229). While a "reasonable inference" may be sufficient under the 
13 
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probable-cause standard, the state may not base its case on speculative possibilities. This 
Court has defined the difference between a reasonable inference and speculation: 
While it is sometimes subtle, there is in fact a difference between drawing a 
reasonable inference and merely speculating about possibilities. An inference is Ma 
conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence < 
from them." Black's Law Dictionary 781 (7th ed. 1999). Stated another way, ,f[a]n 
inference is a deduction as to the existence of a fact which human experience teaches 
us can reasonably and logically be drawn from proof of other facts." Manchester v. 
Dugan, 247 A.2d 827, 829 (Me. 1968). On the other hand, speculation is defined as 
the "act or practice of theorizing about matters over which there is no certain ( 
knowledge." Black's Law Dictionary 1407 (7th ed. 1999). 
In reality, there is no black line between inference and speculation—both are 
way-stations along a continuum that has absolute certainty at one extreme and 
complete impossibility at the other. "When the correlation between the predicate facts
 { 
and the conclusion is slight, then the inference is less reasonable, and 'at some point, 
the link between the facts and the conclusion becomes so tenuous that we call it 
"speculation."'" State v. Copas, 252 Conn. 318, 746 A.2d 761, 782 (2000) (Katz, J. 
dissenting) (quoting Goldhirsh Group, Inc. v. Alpert, 107 F.3d 105, 108 (2nd 
Cir.1997)). < 
Hester, 2000 UT App. 159,1fi[l6-l7; see also Clark, 2001 UT 9, f20 (where evidence was 
reasonably susceptible to supporting intent, "reasonable inference" existed). 
Also, the state may not build a case on a paucity of facts and speculation. .See State 
v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761,764 (Utah 1991) (paucity of facts failed to support inference under 
reasonable-suspicion standard); Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231, 234 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997) (reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than probable cause to arrest). 
According to the following cases, the state must present evidence to establish 
defendant's involvement in a drug crime. While the cases rely on the reasonable-doubt 
standard, that does not change the fact that the state must establish defendant's role in the 
14 
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offense. Indeed, in the preliminary hearing, such a showing must be made under the 
probable-cause standard. See Clark, 2001 UT 9, [^16 (for bindover, the prosecution must 
show that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it). 
In State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, 985 P.2d 911 (Layman ID. an officer initiated a 
traffic stop when he observed malfunctioning taillights on defendant's car. Id at Tf6. During 
the stop, the officer observed that defendant's eyes were watery and bloodshot, and defendant 
appeared upset and fidgety. Id. Suspecting drug use, the officer asked to search the vehicle. 
Id. at T[7. When defendant consented, the officer asked the passenger to step out of the car. 
IdL at Tf8. Once out of the car, the officer asked the passenger to lift her shirt slightly above 
the waistline. She did so and the officer observed a pouch in her waistband. Id. When the 
officer asked the passenger if he could search the pouch, the passenger looked at defendant, 
who "shook his head in a negative fashion for an unspecified length of time." Id The 
officer ultimately searched the pouch and found drugs and paraphernalia. Id. 
Defendant was charged and convicted under a constructive-possession theory for the 
drugs and paraphernalia in the passenger's pouch. Id. at f^l 1. Defendant appealed. In 
considering the matter, this Court took special care to ensure that its review of the evidence 
did not "encourage the indulging of 'inference upon inference,' or, worse, the indulging of 
inference upon assumption." State v. Layman. 953 P.2d 782, 791 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 
(Layman I). To that end, this Court found the evidence was insufficient to support the charge 
for possession. Id at 792. On certiorari review, the Utah Supreme Court agreed: 
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We conclude that the court of appeals properly found the evidence in this case is 
insufficient. When all the brush is cleared, the critical fact is that there was little 
evidence to prove that [the defendant] had such control over [the passenger's] person 
that one could reasonably infer beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly and 
intentionally possessed the drugs and paraphernalia in her pouch. The only fact 
tending to prove [the defendant's] control over [the passenger] is that she looked at 
him when the deputy requested to see the pouch and that [the defendant] shook his 
head in a negative fashion. This simply is not enough. 
Layman IL 1999 UT 79, f 16, 985 P.2d 911 (emphasis added). 
Also, in State v. Scott, 732 P.2d 117, defendant was convicted of drug distribution 
under Section 58-37-8. According to the facts, ff[a]n informant was wired with a tape 
recorder by the police and sent to defendant's home, where he encountered defendant, his 
family, and four other men." Id. at 118. While the informant was at the home, a drug 
transaction occurred. At trial no one could identify which person handled the marijuana or 
which person took the money. Id. Nevertheless, defendant was convicted under an 
accomplice theory for "aiding and abetting" in the drug transaction. Id. He appealed. 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial on the 
basis that the accomplice liability provisions were inapplicable to a drug distribution offense. 
In that regard, since the state would not be able to rely on a general aiding and abetting 
theory, it would be required to present evidence to support that defendant agreed to, 
consented to, offered, or arranged the transaction that took place. The court specified that 
under § 58-37-8, it mattered "very much what the role of [the] defendant [was] in an 
exchange of controlled substances for money." IdL at 120. The state would be required to 
establish defendant's role in the transaction to support the matter. 
16 
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That is consistent with the state's duty in the preliminary hearing. While the standard 
of proof in that hearing is lower than the standard of proof at trial, Clark, 2001 UT 9, }^16, 
the state, nevertheless, is required to establish defendant's role in the transaction to support 
the bindover. "[T]he prosecution must present sufficient evidence to support a reasonable 
belief that an offense has been committed and that defendant committed it." Id. (emphasis 
added). It matters very much what the role of the defendant was in the alleged transaction. 
In this case, the state relied on speculative possibilities to argue that Morales-Torres 
was involved in the transaction that occurred between the officers and the man in the parking 
lot at the Seventh South address. Yet, in the end, Morales-Torres had no role in the exchange 
of controlled substance for money. He did not agree to the transaction that occurred between 
the man in the parking lot and officers; he did not consent to the transaction; he did not offer 
it; and he did not arrange it. Indeed, Morales-Torres1 encounter with the officers ended when 
he would not agree to their requests, and the officers informed Morales-Torres they were not 
going to "do the deal." Morales-Torres then walked away. (R. 131:10-11.) The state is 
unable to establish that Morales-Torres had a role in the later drug purchase. 
In addition, the state's remaining evidence fails to support that Morales-Torres 
engaged in criminal conduct, as further set forth below. 
2. The State's Evidence Was Insufficient to Support Probable Cause. 
In State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159, this Court recognized that in a drug distribution 
case, the state may establish the defendant's role in the transaction where defendant 
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completed a drug sale or "took active steps to facilitate the distribution of cocaine, even if 
the distribution never actually occurred.[FN6]" Id. at Tf 13. 
FN6 Such evidence could include that [defendant] made phone calls seeking 
drugs, see Gallegos, 851 P.2d at 1190; drove around looking for drugs, see Clark, 
783 P.2d at 68-69; commented to [the officer] on how the drugs were to be acquired, < 
see May, 36 Cal.Rptr. at 717; was seen conferring with known drug suppliers, see 
Gallegos, 851 P.2d at 1187; or was shown to be a "link in a chain" of distribution. 
Pelton, 801P.2datl85. 
Id at 1fl3 n.6 (see State's Brief at 10-11). 
In the context of this case, the state claims it presented sufficient evidence to support 
probable cause that a crime occurred and that defendant committed it. It claims it presented < 
evidence that Morales-Torres "took active steps to facilitate the distribution of cocaine," and 
he was a "critical 'link in a chain' of distribution leading to the completed transaction." 
i 
(State's Brief at 11.) Yet, Morales-Torres was not involved in the completed transaction. In 
addition, his conduct did not facilitate "such distribution." Harrison, 601 P.2d at 923-24. 
Specifically, the crime that occurred consisted of the drug purchase between officers 
and the man in the parking lot at the Seventh South address. Morales-Torres had no 
involvement or intent with respect to that crime. Portel admitted as much. Portel testified i 
that during officers' encounter with Morales-Torres, they terminated discussions and he 
walked away. (R. 131:11.) Sometime after Morales-Torres was arrested, the officers "later" 
{ 
looked at their cellular phone and "decided" to go to the Seventh South address "on [their] 
own." (R. 131:12.) Since Morales-Torres had already walked away from the officers, he was 
not involved in their matters, and he had no knowledge or intent with regard to their 
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independent conduct. See State v. Crick. 675 P.2d 527, 534 (Utah 1983) (a defendant can 
be criminally responsible for an act committed by another, but his responsibility is 
determined by his criminal mental state, not by the mental state of the actor): Scott. 732 P.2d 
at 120 (defendant cannot be charged with drug distribution under accomplice liability statute; 
state must establish defendant's role in the transaction). 
The officers' independent decision to engage in a drug transaction cannot be imputed 
to Morales-Torres. He had no involvement in the completed transaction. He did not "agree, 
consent, offer or arrange" the distribution between the officers and the man in the parking 
lot. (R. 131:12 (officers went to the address "on [their] own").) The state failed to establish 
Morales-Torres' involvement or intent in the completed purchase. 
In addition, Morales-Torres did not facilitate the distribution of drugs. His conduct 
with officers did not constitute a crime. When the officers asked Morales-Torres to "hook" 
them up, he asked what they needed. (R. 131:8.) When officers said "coca," Morales-Torres 
asked for change to use the pay phone. (R. 131:8.) Since Morales-Torres had been hanging 
around the pay phone, his request for change was not unreasonable. (See R. 131:6.) The 
request did not support an intent to arrange a drug distribution. 
Thereafter, Morales-Torres used the officers' cellular phone to page a third party, he 
had a conversation that officers could not understand, and he requested that officers take him 
to Seventh South and Ninth West where a man was eating. (R. 131:8-10.) When officers 
refused, Morales-Torres left. (R. 131:11.) That conduct does not support an intent to 
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facilitate a drug distribution under any variation of §58-37-8(l)(a)(ii).1 
The state disagrees. According to the state, the facts and inferences presented at the 
preliminary hearing support that (1) "defendant facilitated the transaction by paging the 
dealer"; (2) Morales-Torres ffarrang[ed] a meeting" between the officers and a dealer; (3) 
Morales-Torres provided "the dealer's location to the undercover officers"; and (4) officers 
were able to find the "dealer" by going to the Seventh South address and hitting redial on the 
cellular phone. (State's Brief at 11.) 
With respect to each point, the state has misstated the evidence and/or based its 
argument on speculative possibilities. To begin, each point is premised on the incorrect 
assumption that Morales-Torres associated with a "dealer." (See State's Brief at 8-9,11 (state 
refers to "dealer" in connection with each point; also the state claims "defendant announced 
in English that he and the officers needed to travel to a specified location to meet with the 
dealer to conclude the drug transaction").) 
Yet, Portel specifically acknowledged that Morales-Torres did not use the term 
"dealer" and he did not say anything about drugs. (R. 131:10; 131:15.) Also, defendant did 
not make any comment about what would happen at the Seventh South location. (R. 131:11.) 
Next, the state's conclusions are speculative. With respect to the state's point (1), 
Consider the following scenario: Suppose Morales-Torres spoke in English on the phone 
to the third party, he did not mention drugs or use the term dealer, officers did not understand 
the conversation, and Morales-Torres insisted that officers take him to the Seventh South 
address. Under those facts, the state would not be able to establish facilitation of a drug 
distribution. The fact that Morales-Torres spoke in Spanish does not change the result. 
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Morales-Torres had a telephone conversation that officers could not understand with an 
unknown person. For all the officers knew, Morales-Torres paged his mother or a sponsor 
for a drug rehabilitation program; he may have used the officers' phone for personal reasons. 
(See R. 132:7 (finding officers had no evidence to support that Morales-Torres talked about 
drugs on the phone).) The paucity of evidence fails to support a crime. 
With respect to the state's points (2) and (3), Portel testified that Morales-Torres told 
the officers they needed to go to Seventh South and Ninth West, and they had to take him 
with them. According to Portel, a man was eating at that address. (R. 131:9-10.) Portel 
testified that Morales-Torres did not make any comment about who was at that address or 
what would occur there. (R. 131:11.) Likewise, Morales-Torres did not say anything about 
drugs or use the term "dealer." (R. 131:9-10, 15.) Thus, it is speculative to conclude that 
Morales-Torres arranged a meeting with a dealer and provided the location to officers. 
With respect to the state's point (4), the state assumes the person Morales-Torres 
paged was the man in the parking lot at Seventh South and Ninth West. (State's Brief at 11.) 
Yet, the officers had no information as to whom Morales-Torres paged, what he discussed 
with the person, or whom Morales-Torres intended to meet at the Seventh South address. 
The officers were informed only that the person at Seventh South was eating. (R. 131:9-10.) 
When the officers "later" "decided" to go to that address (R. 131:12), they had no way to 
know whether the person would still be there. In addition, since Morales-Torres did not say 
what "would go on when" they arrived at the address (R. 131:11), the officers had no way 
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i 
to know whether such person would be involved in a transaction. 
When the officers arrived at the Seventh South address, they hit "redial" on the 
cellular phone in an effort to reach the person Morales-Torres had paged. After hitting 
redial? the officers considered it relevant that a man in the parking lot began talking on a 
cellular phone. (R. 131:13.) They apparently believed the man with the cellular phone was 
the person that Morales-Torres contacted earlier by pager and/or the same person who was 
eating at Seventh South. (See State's Brief at 4.) Yet, he could have been anyone with a 
cellular phone. The state's argument regarding his identity is speculative. 
Also, when officers observed the man in the parking lot, they made eye contact with 
him. According to Portel, buyers "frequently" communicate with dealers by making eye 
contact. (R. 131:7.) Thereafter, the man approached the officers' truck for a drug 
transaction. (R. 131:13.) 
According to Portel, during the transaction the man stated, "yeah, you just paged me." 
(R. 131:13.) That statement is confusing since Portel admittedly had not paged the man. 
(R. 131:13 (when Portel hit redial, the man began talking on a cellular phone).) 
To the extent the officers believed the statement "yeah, you just paged me," related 
to Morales-Torres' page, that belief was nothing more than a hunch. See Johnson, 805 P.2d 
at 764 (officer failed to inquire into the matter; his suspicions and hunches would not support 
reasonable suspicion); Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 234 (reasonable suspicion is lower standard 
than probable cause). 
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Specifically, when the man made the statement about a "page," it would have been 
appropriate for the officers to inquire into the matter. Since the officers apparently believed 
that Morales-Torres had arranged the meeting, it would have been natural to ask whether the 
man knew or was associated with Morales-Torres. There is no evidence to support that 
officers made such an inquiry; there is no evidence to support that the man in the parking lot 
knew Morales-Torres or had contact with him for drugs or otherwise. 
Further, although the officers arrested the man in the parking lot, there is no evidence 
that they discovered a pager in his possession. Yet, according to the facts, when Morales-
Torres was with officers, he contacted the unknown person by paging him. 
The evidence does not support an association. Rather, it supports that the man in the 
parking lot was simply a dealer with a cellular phone. 
Given the paucity of facts, the state's case is insufficient to support that Morales-
Torres facilitated a distribution or was involved in or intended the completed transaction. 
The state is unable to establish that Morales-Torres paged a "dealer"; arranged a meeting 
with a "dealer"; "provided the dealer's location to the officers"; or was associated — either 
criminally or otherwise — with the man in the parking lot. (See State's Brief at 11.) 
Likewise, there is no evidence to support that Morales-Torres "made phone calls seeking 
drugs," "drove around looking for drugs," "commented to [the officers] on how" drugs could 
be acquired, "was seen conferring with known drug suppliers," or was "shown to be 'link'" 
in the officers' later transaction. Hester, 2000 UT A.P. 159, [^13 n.6. Morales-Torres' 
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conduct does not support a crime. See Clark, 2001 UT 9, [^16 (state must show that 
defendant committed a crime). The trial court properly quashed the bindover. The order 
should be affirmed on appeal. 
3. The State Relies on Cases that Are Distinguishable in Relevant Respects. 
The state argues this case is similar to Francis v. State, 890 S.W.2d 510, 513 (Tex. 
App. 1994) (see State's Brief at 9); State v. Gallesos. 851 P.2d 1185, 1190 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993); State v.Clark. 783 P.2d 68,68-69 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); and State v. Pelton. 801 P.2d 
184, 185 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (see State's Brief at 12). The facts in those cases support a 
case of arranging a drug distribution where this case does not. 
In Francis, 890 S.W.2d at 513, undercover officers, who had engaged in a prior drug 
deal with defendant, asked defendant about crack cocaine. Id at 511. Defendant did not 
have any. However, he specifically represented that he knew where to get some. He offered 
to drive with the officers to get the drugs and they agreed to the arrangement. Id Based on 
those facts, the court found that defendant was a link in the chain of a drug distribution. That 
is distinguishable from the facts and inferences in Morales-Torres' case, where he did not 
make any representation concerning drugs or indicate that he knew where to get drugs. 
In Gallegos, 851 P.2d at 1190, officers targeted defendant as a drug distributor and 
intercepted his telephone calls. Id at 1186. Officers recorded calls where defendant pro-
mised others that he would check around for the availability of drugs for purchase, and in 
another call he provided his address to the buyer in order to facilitate a later transaction. Id. 
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at 1190. Gallegos also used terms particular to drug deals during the telephone 
conversations. Id. Gallegos' actions and representations supported that he was a link in the 
chain of a drug distribution. Morales-Torres' case is distinguishable. He did not use terms 
or words particular to drug deals, and he made no promises or representations in this case. 
The evidence fails to support a drug distribution under Gallegos. 
In Pelton, 801 P.2d 184, an undercover agent set up a drug buy with other parties in 
order that he could meet a drug dealer named "Paco." Id. at 185. Defendant assisted in 
facilitating the meeting. He specifically told the agent to drive to a 7-11 store "where they 
were to make a phone call and then 'the man would bring the cocaine to that location."' Id. 
When the parties arrived at the 7-11, defendant got out of the car and spoke to a man in a 
telephone booth, "who turned out to be Paco." Id. Defendant brought the agent and Paco 
together, then left. A drug purchase was consummated. Id. This Court ruled the following: 
Defendant was one link in a chain of events, involving six people, which eventually 
led to the sale of cocaine. There was ample evidence from which the trial court could 
properly conclude that defendant knew that he would be the triggering mechanism to 
bring[ the agent] and Paco together when he had [the agent] drive to the 7-11 store, 
and that he also knew the transaction involved the sale of cocaine. The fact that Paco 
was present at the 7-11 store negated the need to make the phone call to have the 
cocaine delivered. Defendant and [a third party] each spoke to Paco at the telephone 
booth. Paco then made contact with [the agent] and subsequently sold him the 
cocaine. Defendant acted knowingly and intentionally, and he was instrumental in 
arranging the sale of the cocaine. 
14 at 185-86. 
Morales-Torres' case is distinguishable from Pelton. He did not bring the officers 
together with the man in the parking lot. Rather, sometime after Morales-Torres left the 
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officers (R. 131:11), they made a decision "on [their] own" to go to the Seventh South 
address. (R. 131:12.) Officers located a drug dealer there. At the time the officers made the 
independent decision, Morales-Torres did not have any involvement with the officers. In 
addition, there is no evidence linking Morales-Torres to any drug dealer or to the man in the 
parking lot. 
Finally, in Clark, 783 P.2d at 68-69, officers pursued a tip that Adam Hicks was 
trafficking in cocaine. To that end, an undercover officer attended a meeting at Hicks' house, 
where he met defendant. Id. at 68. Defendant represented that the "cocaine to be purchased 
was 'extremely good' and that he and Hicks were partners." Id Thereafter, defendant 
responded to a transaction request from Hicks as follows: 
Defendant, allegedly at Hicks's request, attempted to phone an individual named Ron 
Johnson, but could not reach him. Officer Brian [an undercover agent] and Hicks 
then drove to the Johnson residence in Ogden, while defendant went in a separate car 
to look for Johnson in a bar. Pat Johnson and her daughter were at the Johnson 
residence when Officer Brian and Hicks arrived. Prior to defendant's arrival at the 
house, a cocaine transaction was discussed. Unable to find Johnson, defendant went 
to the Johnson residence. When defendant arrived, details of an agreed-upon cocaine 
transaction were repeated in his presence. Officer Brian testified that when the 
meeting adjourned, he observed a "slight contact" that was similar to a handshake 
between defendant and Pat Johnson. According to Officer Brian, defendant asked 
Hicks if Hicks had seen defendant give Pat Johnson two and a half grams of "re-
rocked" cocaine. 
Id. at 68-69. The defendant's association with known drug dealers was established in Clark. 
That case is distinguishable from this matter, where the state's evidence fails to establish a 
link between Morales-Torres and any known drug dealers. 
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In this matter, the state failed to present evidence to support Morales-Torres' 
involvement in a crime. Morales-Torres did not say anything about drugs; he did not use 
terms relating to drug deals or transactions; he did not represent the availability of drugs; he 
did not express a willingness to check around for drugs; he did not indicate he would make 
a call or look into getting drugs; he did not represent that he knew where to obtain drugs; he 
did not represent that he was willing to facilitate a drug deal; he did not use the term "dealer"; 
he did not associate with a known drug dealer; and he did not represent that officers could 
obtain drugs at the Seventh South address. The state's evidence fails the probable-cause 
standard. See Clark, 2001 UT 9, ffl[15-16 (state must present evidence to support each 
element of the offense, and to support that defendant committed the offense). Morales-
Torres respectfully requests the entry of an order affirming the trial court's ruling. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Morales-Torres requests that this Court affirm the trial 
court's order quashing the bindover since the state failed to present the necessary quantum 
of evidence at the preliminary hearing to support the matter. 
SUBMITTED th i s^day of J j / L ^ „ ^ 2001. 
LINDA M.JONES (J 
JAMES VALDEZ 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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ADDENDUM A 
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58-37-8^ Prohibited acts—Penalties. 
(1) Inhibi ted acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
^ T knowingly and intentionally: 
* ?- ® produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
?:..;
 v produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub-
*-\ ^stance; 
" "(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, ofiFer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to 
distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct 
which results in any violation of any provision of Title 58, 
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more 
violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on 
separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or 
more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position 
of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II or a controlled sub-
stance analog is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or 
subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is 
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of 
a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection 
(l)(a)(ii) or (iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate 
term as provided by law, but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined 
in Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his 
immediate possession during the commission or in furtherance of the 
offense, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a 
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court 
may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term 
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a 
first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term 
of not less than seven years and which may be for Ufe. Imposition or 
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not 
eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescrip-
tion or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of 
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any 
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place 
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knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons 
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in 
any of those locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an 
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled sub-
stance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a 
second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I of II, marijuana, if the 
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a 
controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony, or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted 
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one 
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside 
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as 
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in 
Subsection (2)(b). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any 
controlled substance by a person, that person shall be sentenced to a one 
degree greater penalty than provided in this Subsection (2). 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other 
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), 
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is 
guilty of a third degree felony. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally. 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a 
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, 
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining 
a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to 
be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veteri-
narian, or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to 
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe 
or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain 
possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled 
substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his 
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forg-
ery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order 
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription 
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or 
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j^jfxLxu (iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or 
-other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, 
: "trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or 
-any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or 
•*• labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance, 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a 
)fef£ third' degree felony. * 
t4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
p*- •' (a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not 
|^: authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be 
i unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Parapher-
^ nalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances 
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under 
. Subsection (4)(b) if the act is committed: 
* - (i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the 
grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary insti-
tution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
-"••• (iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other 
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for 
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under 
:
 Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in a church or synagogue; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, 
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included 
in Subsections (4)(a)(i) through (viii); or 
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of 
- age, regardless of where the act occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first 
degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years 
if the penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this 
subsection would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution 
of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for 
probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established 
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), 
a person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more 
than the maximum penalty "prescribed for that offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the 
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at 
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor 
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred 
was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location 
where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class 
B misdemeanor. 
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and 
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by 
law. 
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(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of 
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of 
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which 
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or 
dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that 
the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance 
or substances. 
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the 
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, 
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the sub-
stances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and 
supervision. 
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who 
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance 
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitio-
ner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate 
scope of his employment. 
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to 
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter 
shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
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* *E0 DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JAMES A. VALDEZ #3308 JUL 2 0 2000 
Attomey for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION " ^ v y j f f i S T 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 <*P««V CI«* 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841II 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 
E-mail: jvaldezfg!sllda.com 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DIVISION 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JOSE MORALES-TORRES 
Defendant 
ORDER QUASHING BINDOVER 
AND REMANDING TO PRELIMINARY 
HEARING MAGISTRATE. 
CaseNo.001904616FS 
CAO 00-00-5277 
JUDGE WILLIAM BARRETT 
The above-captioned matter having come on for hearing on the 20* of July, 2000, the 
Defendant JOSE MORALES-TORRES, represented by his attorney James A. Valdez, the States 
representative Deputy District Attorney, Kelly R. Sheffield. 
The evidence presented was the Preliminary Hearing transcript, case law, Memorandums 
and brief argument by attorneys. 
The court having carefully read the transcript, memorandums and case law, finds that in 
review of State v. Hester. 2000 UT App 159, (2000) released after the preliminary hearing in this 
matter, the State has failed to so a "Quantum of Evidence" necessary to bind over, in that: (1) the 
conversation that defendant had with a so called dealer was not understood by Officer Portel 
because it was in the Spanish language and she did not understand what was said nor to whom; 
(2) it was clear that defendant never had any drugs; (3) defendant never mention "cocaine or any 
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other drug; (4) police officers broke off negotiations with defendant and he walked off; 
officers made further contact with drug dealers) on their own, conducted negotiations and; 
(6) there was no evidence that defendant had anything to do with the dealers that the officers 
eventually consummated a drug transaction. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the bind over in the above entitled matter be Quashed 
and me matter be remanded to me Magistrate Court for further hearing. 
lis ctU{ DATED this [day of July, 2000. 
WILLIAM BARRETT, JUDGE 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of the District Attorney, 
231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this day of July, 2000. 
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